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Abstract. This paper is aimed to show the role of responsive regulation in taxation on the example of such
a legal remedy as the settlement agreement between taxpayer and tax administration in the jurisdiction of
Latvia. The legal framework and resent case law of is analyzed on the basis of comparison with the latest
research in the sphere of responsive regulation and the practical implementation of responsive regulation
instruments in the other jurisdictions. The author of the paper comes to the conclusion that the existing
legal model of settlement agreement is not efficient and it should be changed to the model that ensures the
interests of taxpayers and tax administration in the optimal way.
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No one can deny that the issues of taxation are directly connected to the issues of society’s welfare; the
state’s tax incomes are the only guarantee of the effective realization of any kind of social programs. The
aim of any state is the high levels of voluntary tax compliance. So the key issue of almost any scientific
research in taxation is the remedies: economic, social, political, legal or even psychological of making
the tax compliance really voluntary.
In this paper the innovative approach in tax compliance which is called “responsive regulation” is
shown. This method can ensure such important factors of compliance as efficiency and vulnerability.
The use of such an instrument of responsive regulation as the settlement agreement is the key issue of
this paper.
Discussion
According to the definition of the pioneer of the responsive regulation institute – Valerie Braithwaite, the
professor of the Australian National University “The implementation of responsive regulation in taxation
means influencing the community’s commitment to pay tax trough respectful treatment, trough attending
to resistance and reforming faulty process, trough fairly directed and fully explained disapproval of
non-compliant behavior, trough preparedness to administer sanctions, and capacity to follow through to
escalate regulatory intervention in the face of continuing non-compliance” (Braithwaite, 2007).
In the author’s eyes the institute of the settlement agreement in tax sphere fully corresponds to the
aims of responsive regulation. The Latvian legal regulation of the settlement agreement doesn’t state the
aim of the settlement agreement; it is stated in the case law – the aim of the settlement agreement is to
ensure the effective proceeding of the tax administration functions. The settlement agreement between
taxpayer and tax administration is the remedy, which is used by the tax authority in order to get back
the unpaid taxes promptly, not spending state recourses on long lasting debates proving the assessed
amount of unpaid tax (Case Nr. A42314305 SKA – 502/2008, para. [15]).
As we see the taxpayer interests/rights doesn’t play any important role in the implementation of
the institute of the settlement agreement. Such a denying of the taxpayer’s role doesn’t correspond to
the legal nature of the settlement agreement. As it stated in the above mentioned case the settlement
agreement has almost different legal nature in comparison with the administrative act which is the
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unilateral instrument of the public authority (Ibid, para. [13]). The settlement agreement in the tax law
is the administrative agreement in the context of the State Administrative Structure Law. The section 79.
of this law states that “Administrative contracts are agreements between public persons and private
individuals regarding the specification, amendment, termination or determination of administrative
legal relations. . . ” This definition produces the almost different approach – acceptance of the active
role of the taxpayer in conclusion of such an agreement, but it strongly conflicts with existing legal
regulation.
According to the Law on Taxes and Fees section 41. “Entering into of a Settlement Agreement by
the Tax Administration and Taxpayer” taxpayer is entitled to propose to the director-general of the State
Revenue Service to enter into of settlement agreement with State Revenue Service. The conclusion of
such an agreement has two legal conditions:
1) the taxpayer acceptance of the amount of additional tax payment assessed by the State Revenue
Service,
2) the taxpayer obligation to pay the amount of additional tax payment. The legal consequences of
the settlement agreement are that 1) the assessed fine is revoked in the whole sum 2) the assessed
delay penalty is revoked partly (50%). The model shall be called “Penalty model”.
But, the director-general of the State Revenue Service has no free right to enter into a settlement
agreement, such a general condition as the fact that the taxpayer on the day, when the submission
regarding the entering into of a possible settlement agreement is submitted, has no current tax debt
should be observed. One of the under mentioned conditions should exist as the additional factors which
entitle the taxpayer to conclude the settlement agreement:
1) the decision of the director of the State Revenue Service territorial office is disputed, and, in
examining the submission of the taxpayer, the director-general of the State Revenue Service
territorial office has left the disputed decision unchanged or also has taken a new decision with
which the disputed decision is partially revoked; or
2) the taxpayer has submitted a complaint to a court, but the adjudication of the matter has not been
commenced on the merits.
In deciding the issue regarding the entering into of a settlement agreement, the reasons for the creation
of the tax debt and the amount shall be taken into account, as well as the efficiency of continuing the
dispute and the costs associated thereto.
The conclusion of the settlement agreement has a strong restriction that is a settlement agreement
shall not be entered if the tax administration has submitted materials for a decision on the issue of
bringing a criminal action.
Till 03.04.2001 the construction of this norm was almost different and it stated that the director-
general of the State Revenue Service is entitled to enter into of settlement agreement with the taxpayer.
The legal consequence of such an agreement is the reduction of the amount of additional tax payment
assessed by the State Revenue Service. This norm could be used only in the cases when the implemented
norms which are the legal basis of the dispute between taxpayer and State Revenue Service are
contradictory and disputable. This model shall be called “Basic debt model”.
So, the crucial question in the discussion of implementation of the settlement agreement in tax
matters is the question which of the above mentioned models is better (more efficient in economic sense
and more legal – consider the rights of taxpayer and state in the most optimal way): the revocation of
the assessed fine and delay penalty or the reduction of the amount of additional tax payment assessed
by the State Revenue Service (which include as the basic sum of unpaid tax payment, as assessed fine
and delay penalty).
According to the existing legal model of the settlement agreement the taxpayer interests/rights don’t
play any important role in the implementation of the institute of the settlement agreement. Such a
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Figure 1. The dynamics of the inquiries on the entering into settlement agreement in criminal offences (in absolute
numbers).
denying of the taxpayer’s role doesn’t correspond to the legal nature of the settlement agreement. As
it stated in the above mentioned case the settlement agreement has almost different legal nature in
comparison with the administrative act which is the unilateral instrument of the public authority (Case
Nr. A42314305 SKA – 502/2008, para. [13]).
The settlement agreement in the tax law is the administrative agreement in the context of the State
Administrative Structure Law. The section 79. of this law states that “Administrative contracts are
agreements between public persons and private individuals regarding the specification, amendment,
termination or determination of administrative legal relations. . . ” This definition produces the almost
different approach — acceptance of the active role of the taxpayer in conclusion of such an agreement,
but it strongly conflicts which existing legal regulation.
As the professor Braithwaite says: “The hard question is how we decide when to punish and when to
persuade?” (Braithwaite, 2002; 19). In order to answer this question the responsive regulation strategy
suggests to use the so – called “regulatory pyramid” that is the algorithm of decision making. “At
the base of the pyramid is the most responsive dialogue – based approach we can craft for securing
compliance just with law. As we move up the pyramid, more and more demanding and punitive
interventions in people’s lives are involved. The idea of the pyramid is that our presumption should
always be to start at the base of the pyramid, than escalate to somewhat punitive approaches only when
modest forms of punishment fail” (Ibid; 20).
The role of the settlement agreement in the existing configuration – “Penalty model” as the tool of
the responsive dialogue unfortunately is not analyzed not from the sight of the State Revenue Service
nor the Ministry of Finance; there is no statistic data depicting the dynamics and factors motivating of
the entering the settlement agreement or not doing so. The only fact that is obvious is the fact that tax
debts calculated by the State Revenue Service stayed unpaid in 2010 (statistic data for the 9.months
period) is the amount of 99, 3 millions of lats (www.vid.gov.lv).
So, in order to analyze the effectiveness of the settlement agreement in a starting stage of the
responsive dialogue, the role of the settlement agreement in the other area than the area of taxes could
be analyzed. For the adequate sphere of comparison the criminal law area could be chosen. The legal
model of the tax disputes has much in common with the disputes in criminal offences. This thesis is
based on the resent case law of the European Court of Human Rights (cases: Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag
and Vulic v. Sweden, Funke v.France, Salabiaku v. France, “Bulves”AD v. Bulgaria), that bases the legal
analyses of the above mentioned tax disputes on the interpretation of criminal law principils.
According to the Criminal Procedure Law section 381. the settlement procedure ensures the State
Probation Service. The settlement “is possible in criminal proceedings, and that the involvement of
an intermediary is useful, a person directing the proceedings may inform the State Probation Service
regarding such possibility or usefulness.” The organization of the entering procedure of the settlement
agreement State Probation Service has started in the 2005, and, as it seen in the Figure Nr.1 the use of
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these legal remedy has an obvious prompt dynamics. According to the data of the State Probation Service
the biggest amount of the settlement agreement inquiries is in the criminal charges for commitment the
theft. (Central Office of the State Probation Service. The public overview for the year of 2009, p.15).
The data of the Central Office of the State Probation Service. The public overview for the year of
2009, p.15 (www.probacija.lv).
Such a dynamics get the basement to make a conclusion that the use of settlement agreement could
be an effective remedy in the settlement of legal disputes. But, the question that remains is the question
why such a remedy taking into account the amounts of assessed taxes that is not paid back to the state is
not effectively used in the tax disputes. The answer could be simple: the existing “Penalty model” isn’t
attractive for the taxpayers. So the next research question is why: what are the reasons legal, economic
or psychological, or all in one?
An essential instrument of responsive regulation in taxation is the “tailoring punishment so that a
concession is made for self-regulatory effort”. The tailoring punishment model has been chosen for the
reasons of “process efficiency and outcome consistency” (Braithwaite, 2007). The tailoring punishment
basis is the formation element of the Australian Taxation Office Compliance Model, which has been
invented in the year of 1998 and since then been exported and adapted by the other jurisdictions (UK,
New Zealand, Indonesia and within the US) (Ibid).
The tailoring punishment concept fully corresponds to the public choice theory which emphasizes
the material interests citizens have in enacting or defeating legislation, an attention to norms reveals
that people are highly motivated to create rules that may not affect their material interests (McAdams,
Rasmusen, 2004). In the case of Latvia one of the possible reasons of not active use of the settlement
agreement as a remedy of solving the tax dispute is the lack of material interests from the sight of the
taxpayer: the legal consequences of the settlement agreement in the “Penalty model” which are: 1) the
assessed fine is revoked in the whole sum 2) the assessed delay penalty is revoked partly are considered
not material attractive, and so the whole model is rejected.
One more factor that could explain the low effectiveness of the settlement agreement of the
“Penalty model” is the lack of the “positive action” from the sight of the tax authority in the taxpayer
interpretation. According to the resent research of the psychological aspects in the relationship between
taxpayer and tax authority the interesting finding has been considered: “The relationship between
taxpayers and state can be seen as a relationship or psychological contact, which involves strong
emotional tiers and loyalties. Such a psychological tax contract can be maintained by the positive
action” (Torgler, 2008). Settlement agreement of the “Penalty model” possibly doesn’t associated to
the taxpayer’s with the positive action of the tax authority, it could be particularly truth to the situations
when the basement of the dispute between taxpayer and tax authority is thecontroversial legal norms.
It should be mentioned that the situation of controversial legal norms is common in tax law. Such a
situation is constrained with the very character of tax law and the its forming legal norms. Hart HLA
has stated that rules have a core meaning and a penumbra where their meaning is more uncertain. The
more complex phenomenon is regulated, the wider the penumbra is likely to be (Braithwaite, 2005). The
object of the regulation of the tax law is the complex area that tends to regulate many domains in one
time: economic, legal, political. So, it is obvious that the tax legislation contains an enormous amount
of the controversial legal norms. In some jurisdictions, for example – Russian federation, tax legislation
consists the legal rule according to which all irremovable contradictions of tax legislation should be
interpreted in the favor to the taxpayer (Tax Code of the Russian Federation Section 3. paragraph 7).
Such a regulation could be considered as the element of responsive regulation in taxation and as an
effective basement for the positive action of ht tax authority. Unfortunately, Latvian tax legislation
doesn’t contain such a legal regulation; however, such a legal norm could be a starting legal point for
the implementation of the settlement agreement of the Basic debt model. However, such a legal norm
in the absence of the effective model of the settlement agreement in practice could be implemented and
interpreted in the court decisions in a very provocative way denying the very legal character of it – the
case of Russia proves this thesis (see the detailed review of the court’s interpretation of this norm in
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the research of Hagorna .H. Halogovie spori ocenka dokazatelstv v sude. Moskva:
sticihform 2009, c. 41–44).
After such a severe critics of the Penalty model the benefits of the Basic debt model should be
analyzed. In the resent research in tax compliance on the first front the have come the non-economic
factors of the compliance. It has been stated in the empirical way that such a notions as justice and
fairness play an important role in taxpayer’s evaluations of the tax system and in their decision to
comply or not comply with tax laws (Wenzel, 2003). Wenzel sees the tree areas of justice: distributive
justice, procedural justice and retributive justice. In the author’s view settlement agreement belongs to
the remedies of the retributive justice. According to the Wenzel definition retributive justice reefers to
the fairness of sanctions and reactions to the breaking of social rules and norms. “Deservingness of
the punishment should depend on the perceived importance of the violated rule, the severity of rule
violation and degree of responsibility an blame attributed to the actor” (Ibid). The fact is obvious in the
cases when controversial legal norm is a matter of tax dispute. In such situation the level of perceived
importance of the rule violated is close to zero: the taxpayers feels itself as a person who doesn’t deserve
the punishment, but have no chance to prove it in a legal way or come to the adequate decision which
could respect the interests of the both parts of the dispute and ensure the right on different interpretation
of the disputable legal norm. In such cases the Basic debt model is the “fair price” for inability of the
state to formulate precise the limits of legal permissions and prohibitions.
Conclusion
1. The use of the settlement agreement in existing legal framework of Latvian tax law has many
controversial aspects: the regulation is not responsive. 2. The existing legal model of the settlement
agreement belongs to the models of deterrence punishment and doesn’t consider interests of taxpayers.
3. The effective model of the settlement agreement should take into account as well as the economic
as the social aspects that motivates taxpayer to enter the settlement agreement. 4. The legal criteria of
controversial legal regulation for conclusion the settlement agreement is the proper legal basis. 5. The
Basic debt model has more positive aspects then Penalty model 6. The section 41. of the Law on Taxes
and Fees should be changed to the legal model of the Basic debt model.
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